The Return to the River Basin: The Increasing Costs of “Jurisdictional Externalities” by Howe, Charles W. (Chuck)
Howe26
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATIONUCOWR
The Return to the River Basin: The Increasing
Costs of “Jurisdictional Externalities”
Charles W. (Chuck) Howe
University of Colorado - Boulder
2003 Warren A. Hall Medal Winner
UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL ON WATER RESOURCES
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATION
ISSUE 131, PAGES 26-32, JUNE 2005
There is a long history of recognition of theriver basin as the natural unit for riverdevelopment, planning and management. In
the U.S. and internationally, there is also a long history
of breaking up river basins among many jurisdictions,
most having nothing to do with water. At present
because of the failure to focus development, planning
and management on the river basin “jurisdictional
externalities” are rising rapidly.  Can we move back
toward the river basin from the current splintered
framework to achieve “win-win” improvements? It
is suggested that “virtual river basins” can be
created using current satellite technologies and
through the extension of water markets to an
interstate (if not international) basis.
Historical Background
Over past millenia, the river basin has been used
as the entity for river planning and management.
The origins of irrigation development in the Tigris
and Euphrates Valleys go back to 6000 B.C.
involving interdependent diversions from both rivers
(Christensen 1993; Postel 1999). China’s attempts
to control the Yellow River go back to 4000 B.C.
The Indus Basin was settled and managed by 2300
B.C. (Postel 1999), while the ingenious Dujianyang
irrigation and flood control project on the Min River
in Sezchwan Province of China was designed and
built around 1600 B.C. by the still revered engineer
Li Bao (Van Slyke 1988). Given the technologies
available in those eras, these large undertakings
required huge work forces and centralized control
over the entire effort. These undertakings were the
subject of Wittfogel’s (1957) arguments about the
importance of “hydraulic societies” and the historical
existence of “oriental despotism” (Wittfogel 1957).
An exception to this pattern of centralized control
was Egypt’s use of the Nile River, based on its
decentralized system of small basin irrigation that
continued for more than 5,000 years, in spite of vast
changes in Egypt’s political fortunes. The Nile, in flood
stage, was much too large to control with known
technologies, so the irrigation works were localized
and small scale (Butzer 1976; Drower 1954).
In the mid-nineteenth century, the faculty of the
Ecole National de Ponts et Chaussees (ENPC) in Paris
was one of the most prominent promoters of the river
basin approach. The “Agences de Basin” proposed by
ENPC are still the planning and management agencies
in France.  ENPC (especially engineer and economist
Jules Dupuis) developed not only engineering techniques
but also important tools of economic analysis including
use of demand curves for transportation modes and
the concept of the area under a demand curve as a
measure of user benefits (Ekrlund and Hebert 1973).
In the U.S., the Inland Waterway Commission
appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1907
during the early era of “scientific management and
the gospel of efficiency” of natural resources (Hays
1958) strongly promoted centralized control of the
major rivers and multi-purpose river development.
During the depression of the 1930s, expanded roles
and authority of the federal government allowed
for tight coordination between the various
government water agencies–a condition not seen
since. The federal government also developed the
Tennessee Valley Project, the U.S.’s only attempt
at basin-wide comprehensive development. This
vast enterprise—including flood control, irrigation,
power generation, fertilizer production and
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assistance in urban development—was undertaken
without even consulting the states involved
(Trelease 1971).
The 1965 federal Water Resources Planning Act
created the Water Resources Council to coordinate
federal water development and management
activities (Rogers 1993). The Council, consisting of
the Secretaries of the departments involved with
water, was to provide rational, coordinated planning.
The Act also authorized the establishment of new
river basin commissions to coordinate federal and
state efforts for basin-wide planning. Membership
consisted of the riparian states in each basin, plus
federal agencies with programs in the basin. The
New England, Great Lakes, Ohio, Pacific Northwest,
Upper Mississippi and Missouri Commissions
showed substantial achievements but were hampered
by a unanimity rule for major decisions, along with
upstream and downstream conflicts and “turf
protection” by the federal agencies (Ingram 1971).
In the 1968–1973 period, the U.S. National Water
Commission carried out an extensive set of studies
leading to a landmark report, Water Policies for
the Future (1973). The report strongly emphasized
the importance of the basin approach., Under the
Commission sponsorship, a group chaired by Gary
Hart produced a major study, Institutions for Water
Planning-Institutional Arrangements: River
Basin Commissions, Inter-Agency Committees
and Ad Hoc Coordinating Committees (1971) that
emphasized the need for a whole basin approach.
More recently in 1998, the U.S. Western Water
Policy Review Advisory Commission issued an
incisive report, Water in the West: Challenge for
the Next Century that emphasized the need to
coordinate increasingly popular watershed initiatives
with river basin goals. Just how this was to be
achieved was not made clear.
Technological developments have made basin-
wide and real time modes of river management much
more practical. Tele-monitoring of streamflows has
been in use for more than 20 years, while satellite
imagery of weather and flood events now makes it
possible to allocate water on a basin-wide, real time
basis rather than in terms of monthly or yearly
average flows. Rain storm events are forecasted so
that streamflows and storage capacities can be
managed to greater advantage. Lynne Bennett  and
colleagues (Bennett, Howe and Shope 2000) have
shown that the economically optimal compact
allocations of river flow between upper and lower
basin states are, generally, neither fixed quantity
allocations (like the Colorado Compact) nor
percentage-of-flow allocations (like the Arkansas
Compact). Instead economic optimality usually
requires more complex allocative formulae. Kilgour
and Dinar (2001) have shown that real time basin-
wide river management is superior to periodic
accounting combined with simpler allocation
formulae. These new technologies have opened up
new possibilities for real time, basin wide
administration.
Breaking Up the River Basin
When Ohio was admitted as a state in 1802, the
federal government retained title to all public lands
and associated water bodies, thus retaining the
possibility of federal water management in a river
basin context. However, many federal policies since
the mid-19th century have had the effect of reducing
federal control over water resources, reducing
possibilities for basin-wide management (Trelease
1971). The 1877 Desert Land Act required that
settlers make water claims under state law. The 1897
National Forest Act required those using forest lands
to claim water under state laws. The 1902
Reclamation Act required authorized projects to
proceed in conformity with state laws for claiming
water, as did the Federal Power Act of 1920. The
McCarren Amendment1  requires all federal agencies
to pursue claims for needed water under state laws,
in spite of the “Winters Doctrine” of 1912 that
implicitly accorded to federal reserved lands (e.g.,
forests, BLM lands, national parks) waters necessary
for intended purposes of the reservation. While the
Winters Doctrine has been narrowed by several court
cases for federal water claims, it is still the major
factor in the water claims of Native American
reservations.
In 1982, the Reagan administration down-graded
the Water Resources Council to a non-policy status
and abolished the river basin commissions that had been
established under the 1965 Act. This has left a very
mixed picture, especially across the western states:
1. states have wide jurisdiction over water
administration;
2. federal agencies  must abide by state water
laws in acquiring water rights;
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3. the federal government retains control over
navigable rivers and their major tributaries for
purposes of navigation and power generation;
4. international treaties and interstate compacts
relating to water over-ride all state laws;
5. the programs of the Army Corps of Engineers
(mostly flood control and navigation) have
never been subject to state control;
6. the 1974  Endangered Species Act can over-
ride state water administration;
7. as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Arizona vs. California in 1963, the Secretary
of Interior was given control over major water
allocation issues in the Lower Basin of the
Colorado River; and
8.  in 2004, the Secretary of Interior stated that
states must find the solutions to water problems
(U.S. Department of Interior, 2004).
As a well known water planner stated, “U.S,
water management has been transformed into an
ad hoc problem-solving enterprise that neglects
basic principles.”
Increasing Costs of Failure to
Focus on the River Basin:
“Jurisdictional Externalities”
It must be recognized that many of the institutional
developments that stand as impediments to
comprehensive river basin planning were intended
to achieve water and non-water related objectives.
Examples include:
1. the recognition of national sovereignty in the
case of international rivers;
2. the federalist goal of stronger roles for the
states in the case of interstate rivers, such as
“maximization of the use of water” made in
the Colorado State Constitution;
3. keep water rights simple and subject to
transfer without consideration of water quality
impacts of transfers;
4. prohibitions of inter-basin and/or interstate
transfers to safeguard basins of origin and the
state’s water supply; and
5. reluctance to issue water rights for instream
flows for fear of monopolization of the river.
Thus there are trade-offs between the economic
efficiency that might be achieved through system-
wide management and other public policy objectives.
In some cases, these trade-offs may have been
planned but, I suspect, in most cases the efficiency
losses were ignored.
 Many efficiency losses result from the lack of
congruence of administrative and river basin
boundaries. This class can be called “jurisdictional
externalities.” There is evidence that economic
efficiency losses are increasing as demands on our
river systems increase. Trade-offs among objectives
that once may have been appropriate are now likely
to be out-dated. The Colorado River Compact of
1922 provides a clear example (Meyers 1966; Water
Education Foundation 1997; 1999), involving seven
riparian U.S. states and Mexico. The compact was
agreed upon to relieve uncertainties about future
water availability between the Upper and Lower
Basins. Mexico was not considered at all. Once the
Compact was signed and under existing institutional
arrangements (e.g., no interstate water markets),
the Upper Basin had no incentive to take into account
the value of additional water in the Lower Basin.
Nonetheless, supplemented by the construction of
Glen Canyon Dam and the Central Arizona Project,
the Compact has worked reasonably well for the
riparian states.  However, the current five year
drought has introduced new threats. Since Lake
Powell has been reduced to a very low level, power
production and existing uses in the Upper Basin are
threatened.
At the time the Compact was designed, there
was little or no concern about the maintenance of
instream flows and values such as power, recreation,
and ecosystems. The studies by Young and Booker
(1995) of severe, extended drought in the Colorado
Basin clearly showed that, under current
institutional arrangements (the “law of the river”),
very large losses to both basins are likely to occur,
72% of which will be instream values. Interestingly,
it was estimated that 85% of the losses to
consumptive uses (agriculture and M&I) could be
reduced by more efficient intra-state allocations.
This study was largely ignored for a decade by
water officials but is now being widely cited as
evidence of the need to reconsider the “law of the
river” in the U.S. In addition to current and future
losses in the U.S., there have been severe losses
to Mexican agriculture and the unique riparian eco-
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systems of the River Delta in Mexico (Getches
2003; Luecke et al. 1999).
The Rio Grande River, involving Colorado, New
Mexico, Texas, and Mexico has been a source of
conflict since the turn of the 20th century when the
initial treaty between the U.S. and Mexico was
signed. Allocation of the U.S. share among the three
states is also controlled by inter-state treaty. Current
drought conditions have stressed this river, pitting
endangered species issues (the “silvery minnow” in
the Middle Rio Grande) against agriculture,
ecosystems against recreation use. Under the
drought, Mexico has been unable to deliver the river
water agreed upon in the 1944 treaty. Steps toward
integrated management of the river could reduce
the magnitude of these problems (Texas Center for
Policy Studies 2002).
The well watered eastern U.S. river basins face
similar problems. Georgia, Alabama, and Florida
have been unable to agree (after 13 years of
negotiations) on joint management of the
Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, and Flint (ACF) Rivers
that they share. Alabama and Florida claim large
losses of hydro-electric, recreation, navigation,
fisheries, and environmental benefits (Lipford 2004;
see also Ruhl 2005 in this issue). It has been
suggested that development of interstate water
markets would be an effective way of optimizing
water use among the states, but it is not clear that
agreement can be reached. The threat of judicial
apportionment by the U.S. Supreme Court may be
required to motivate an acceptable compact.
Internationally, conflict is in prospect for several
major river basins. The Nile River has been managed
by a compact between Egypt and the Sudan, but the
other upstream riparian countries are now planning
large consumptive diversions with no coordination
with Egypt and the Sudan. Most advanced are
Ethiopia’s plans for large irrigation projects out of
the Blue Nile. Political uncertainties surround the
White Nile, making international agreement unlikely.
The Ganges is another case where upstream
development by India has adversely affected
Bangladesh’s water supply. The Mekong is vital to
transport, power, fisheries and agriculture for
Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
The international Mekong Commission has been
successful in mediating the growing demands of the
downstream countries and effecting some ecosystem
protection. However, China is not party to the
Commission and China has plans for a series of dams
on the upper river. It is unlikely that consideration will
be given to downstream effects. In Southwest Africa,
the Okavango River faces similar challenges.
Originating in long war-torn Angola and comprises
the boundary with Namibia and empties in the great
Okavango Swamp in Botswana, one of the world’s
most unique ecosystems, critical to Botswana’s
tourism. With calm prevailing in Angola and with
increasing demands on the river by Namibia, the future
of the Okavango system is in question. Thus across
many international river basins, benefits lost through
lack of coordination will grow unless ways are found
to manage the rivers in a comprehensive way.
Can We Build “Virtual River
Basins”?
It seems unlikely that nations, states, and all the
special districts that currently have a say in water
planning and management will surrender their
prerogatives to unified river basin initiatives. Steps
towards basin-wide integration will have to be gradual
with rewards to all parties involved. Since
institutional change always involves losers, as well
as winners, progress depends in part on devising
ways of compensating the losers in ways consistent
with their long-run aspirations. In the face of climate
change, cherished institutional arrangements will
have to be revisited as we have seen in the Colorado
Basin.  Several currently feasible steps could take
us toward what we might call “virtual river basins,”
i.e. not politically nor jurisdictionally unified regions
but basin-wide water allocation principles and
mechanisms that can result in “win-win” efficiency
improvements.
A first step could be the adoption of the principle
of “benefit sharing” in place of just water sharing.
This was described by John Krutilla in his analysis
of the negotiations of the Columbia River treaty
between the United States and Canada (Krutilla
1967). Since the Columbia originates in the U.S.,
sweeps into the canyons of Canada and then returns
to the U.S., efficient development required large
reservoir storage in Canada to support power
generation, navigation and fisheries downstream in
the U.S. The Treaty solution was to arrange regular
monetary payments to Canada, along with sharing
of electric power from the lower river with British
Columbia. Similar arrangements can be envisioned
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on other rivers. Benefit sharing really consists of
inducing cooperation through equitable compensation,
not necessarily in terms of water.
 Extra-market compensation frequently
accompanies agricultural-to-urban water transfers
in the western U.S.  The State of Colorado requires
“compensatory storage” for any project exporting
water from the Colorado River Basin to other basins
in the State (Grigg 2003). This storage is intended to
provide insurance against the possibility of future
shortages for the exporting area. However,
compensatory storage may not be efficient if the
exporting basin has other, higher priority needs, or if
the probability of shortage is close to zero. Green
Mountain Reservoir on the Blue River (tributary to
the Colorado) was built by the Bureau of
Reclamation as compensatory storage for the
Colorado-Big Thompson Project (C-BT) that diverts
water from the Upper Colorado to the (eastern
slope) Big Thompson River. The reservoir was not
needed for flow augmentation for its first 50 years,
although it did generate electric power and provide
recreation.
The Windy Gap Project, an extension of the C-
BT trans-mountain diversions, provided various
forms of compensation including added storage and
other infrastructure to western slope irrigation
districts whose costs increased as a result of the
added water exports (Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District website u.d.) Colorado cities
that buy agricultural water rights are often required
by the water courts to provide for the re-vegetation
of the dried-up farmland and frequently voluntarily
offer extra-market compensation to local
governments of the area of origin.
A second step is to take full advantage of newly
developed optimization and surveillance
technologies that facilitate basin-wide real time
management using more efficient but complicated
allocation rules. Bennett et al. (2000) has
demonstrated the superiority of general allocation
rules (i.e., neither fixed delivery nor percentage
rules) for interstate compacts, while Kilgour and
Dinar (2001) have shown the potential gains from
real time allocation. Maximum gains from these
innovations would require the use of “real time
benefit functions” to direct water to its most
valuable uses at all points in time. Increasing the
time resolution of benefit (demand) functions
requires further study but is approached in irrigation
optimization models that distinguish different stages
of crop growth and yield responsiveness. The
potential gains may be sufficient to overcome the
reluctance of states and water agencies to enter
into more comprehensive river management
arrangements.
A third step would be to expand the geographical
scope of water leasing or sale markets to an interstate
(or even international) basis. Selling or even leasing
water out-of-state has not been permitted because
of state fears of “losing the water” forever. These
fears can be overcome by the establishment of
continuous, low transaction cost water markets. At
least two reasonable proposals have been made in
Colorado. In 1984, the Galloway Group, Ltd.
proposed construction of a dam on the Yampa River
to store unused peak flows to which Colorado was
entitled and for which Galloway held water rights
with the intent of leasing the water to Lower Basin
States (Gross 1985). There was severe opposition
by the Upper Basin States on the basis of inferred
Compact territorial use limitations and by
environmental groups since the river had no major
dams. In 1990, a group of investors called the
Resource Conservation Group developed a plan for
annually drying up irrigated acreage in southwestern
Colorado on a rotating basis among cooperating
farms with the reduced consumptive use being made
available for downstream leasing. The State would
not license the scheme in spite of detailed economic
studies that showed substantial gains to the exporting
region and to the State as a whole (Viscoli 1991).
In 1994, the Colorado River Board of California
convened a workshop to propose an interstate lease
market (water bank) among the Colorado Basin
states (Colorado River Board of California 1994).
The idea was that those having water available for
lease under state laws or wanting to acquire water
would post their offers with their own state engineer
office which would check “no-injury” issues and
forward approved offers to an interstate banking
authority that could match offers to buy and sell.
Contracts would be for one year only. Colorado
quickly shot down the proposal even though the
Colorado State Engineer, as a workshop participant,
expressed enthusiasm for the idea (for which he
was fired!).
Recently the States of Arizona and Nevada have
entered into an interstate agreement, with the
guidance of the Bureau of Reclamation and the assent
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of the Secretary of Interior. Arizona has agreed to
“bank” for 30 years 40,000 acre-feet per year from
the currently unused portion of its Colorado River
allocation. This water will be provided to Nevada as
needed in the future (though the delivery mechanism
has not been made clear). Nevada will pay $23 million
per year to cover Arizona’s costs of groundwater
recharge, plus $100 million “up front”. Nevada has
also pledged political support for a change in the
federal law that places Arizona’s priority to Colorado
River water behind those of California and Nevada
(Arizona Daily Star 2004). It is widely agreed that
water markets of all types must be supervised to avoid
third party injury (Howe 2002). Each of the interstate
proposals noted above adheres to the exporting state’s
rules, including no instate injury. However, water
markets are limited in their ability to protect non-
consumptive instream benefits such as recreation,
ecosystem maintenance, and even hydro-power that
are not represented by water rights in many cases.
The Booker study cited above found that the greatest
losses from extended drought were to recreation,
power and environmental values, values generated
by flows not represented by water rights.
Another question is whether or not the rapidly
expanding number of watershed initiatives is likely
to be consistent with broader river basin objectives.
A survey of 118 “watershed initiatives” in the
western U.S. by the Natural Resources Law Center
at the University of Colorado (Kenney et al. 2000)
showed that the objectives generally sought by these
organizations are compatible with the objectives that
would apply to the basin as a whole: flow regimes,
water quality, sedimentation control, fish and wildlife
preservation, endangered species, land use
management, and general environmental concerns.
It seems clear that these actions complement broader
river basin concerns. Within most of the western
states, these watershed initiatives are organizing
umbrella groups for the exchange of ideas and
experience and to promote cooperation in larger
watersheds.
In summary, “benefit sharing” and the interstate
extension of water markets should take us a
significant distance towards integrated river basin
management.
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Notes
1. The McCarren Amendment can be found at 43 U.S.C.
§666 (1988).
